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1. Introduction 
  The new economics of agrarian institutions has achieved some striking developments.' 
Among these, the interests of economists have been focusing on the modeling of land tenancy. 
However, except for the following studies, existing models remain incomplete in the sense 
that agricultural labor contracts have not been considered, although they are close substitutes 
for land tenancy contracts. 
  Bardhan [3] analyzed a permanent labor contract which has a high degree of substitutability 
with a tenancy contract. He explained the choice of the fixed-wage permanent labor contract 
in terms of risk sharing between the risk-averse laborer and the risk-neutral landholder who 
faces an uncertain spot market. In another paper, Bardhan [2] proposed an alternative 
explanation for the choice of the fixed-wage permanent labor contract from the viewpoint of 
saving recruitment costs. In both papers, he assumed that the work efforts of laborers are 
enforceable without any incentive scheme. 
  Bardhan's papers focused on the longer duration of the permanent labor contract and did 
not explain why the employment relationship between the landholder and laborers is highly 
personalized and involves patronage premium in return for loyalty. 
  Eswaran and Kotwal [10] showed how the fixed-wagepermanent lal5or contract could 
elicit loyal work effort from a permanent laborer if the employer would pay more than the 
laborer's opportunity income. Their model assumed that the contract was unenforceable x 
ante and that only the fixed-wage contracts were offered to laborers. 
 But as Binswanger and Rosenzweig [7] pointed out, the fixed-wage contract would not be 
chosen if a tenancy contract was an available option to laborers. This is because such a labor
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contract would not derive any work incentive from the laborer. 
 In keeping with this insight, Chuma, Otsuka, and Hayami [91 showed that the fixed-tenancy 
contract would be chosen if the choice of contract was endogenous. Why then was a fixed-
wage permanent labor contract chosen? 
 From their theoretical analysis, Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami [281 postulated that the fixed-
wage permanent labor contract would not be chosen, unless land tenancy were socially or 
legally prohibited. For example, they alleged that permanent labor could be observed where 
land tenancy was prohibited by institutional constraints, such as the caste system in India, 
feudalistic regulations in pre-modem Japan, or the tenancy regulations of the Agrarian Land 
Reform Law in the Philippines. 
  However, a number of cases do not conform to their analysis. First, it has been reported 
that the fixed-wage permanent labor contract in the Philippines, called kasugpong, had been 
widely observed even before Presidential Decree No. 27 (the Agrarian Land Reform Law) 
came into effect. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the fixed-wage permanent labor contract 
had been spreading as a substitute for tenancy because of the legal restrictions on the choice 
of tenancy contract 2 Second, it is argued that during the Tokugawa era in Japan, the conversion 
of permanent laborers to tenants became common not only because agrarian laws were losing 
their effect, but also because owner cultivation became unprofitable due to the rise in the 
cost of hired labor brought about by the increase in off-farm employment opportunities.' 
Third, there is insufficient evidence to prove that permanent laborers who belong to lower 
castes in India were prevented from leasing land. According to the statistical data from the 
Indian Ministry of Labor, the changes in occupation from an agricultural laborer to a tenant, 
and vice versa, occurred frequently.4 These facts indicate that there is inconsistency in the 
hypothesis by Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami. Finally, Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami insisted 
that the evolution of land tenancy contracts in Java, where there did not exist strict regulations 
on land tenancy, supported their hypothesis. But in the alleged land tenancy contract, the 
landowner conducts the tasks requiring decision making and the supervision of permanent 
laborer, and shoulders all the production costs, although the sharing arrangement of output is 
the remarkable feature of the contract. In this respect, the contract is similar to the 
sharecropping permanent labor contract (mentioned below) but quite different from share 
tenancy contracts, such as kasama in the Philippines under which the tenant conducts all the 
managerial tasks.$ 
 Furthermore, fixed-wage permanent labor contracts had been widely observed in the pre-
agrarian-reform Philippines, and in prewar China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.6 In 
these cases, the contracts usually had structures that made them enforceable through a patron-
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client relationship, a debtor-creditor relationship, or suretyship. As is well known, if the 
contract is enforceable and the landowner isrisk-neutral, the optimality of the fixed-wage 
labor contract can be proved using the Cheung-Stiglitz-Newbery framework [8] [33] [26]. 
Therefore, the existence of the fixed-wage permanent labor contract is not so mysterious. 
  The question iswhy a permanent labor contract ischosen without contractenforceability, 
such as for the cases in Central Luzon in the Philippines and in Java, Indonesia.' 
  In the Philippines, the sharecropping permanent labor contract, known as porsiyentuhan, 
became common in the 1980s among rice farmers in Central Luzon and Iloilo where agrarian 
land reform had been smoothly implemented and dramatic ncreases inrice yields had been 
achieved ue to the introduction ofmodern rice technology. In this contract, he laborer has 
the obligation of performing certain preassigned tasks (land preparation, plant care, water 
management, fertilizer application, supervision of casual laborers), while he is allowed to 
work outside his landowner's farm as a casual worker in order to supplement the permanent 
labor income that is paid as a share of output (usually 10 or 12 per cent). The landowner is
engaged in managerial work requiring judgment (timing farm operations, deciding on the 
amount of farm inputs, confirmation ofperformance ofpermanent laborers, etc.), while he 
shoulders all the expenditures for farming. 
  As shown in Eswaran and Kotwal [11] and Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami [28], in the 
principal-agency framework, a sharing arrangement is chosen when the landowner provides 
management i put by himself. Their models, however, do not intent to prove that the 
sharecropping labor contract rather than the share tenancy contract would be chosen. 
Moreover, their models are inconsistent with the fact that in the area examined inthis study, 
the farms with permanent labor have usually obtained ahigher factor intensity than those 
without permanent labor. 
 The objective of this paper is to elucidate the background of sharecropping permanent 
labor which has become common in Central Luzon in the Philippines since the 1980s, and to 
present an alternative hypothesis about he choice of a sharecropping permanent labor contract. 
 In the next section, itwill be shown that he adoption of modern rice technology raised the 
rice yield during the same period that he permanent labor contract was becoming common. 
It will also be shown that he landowner who uses permanent labor usually has a higher off-
farm job opportunity cost and that he permanent laborer eceives ahigher income than his 
opportunity income. Empirical evidence will be presented showing that the managerial 
ability of the landowner crucially affects profitability if modern technology is adopted. 
 Based on these four findings, itis postulated in Section 3that if the contractual arrangements
105
reduce the transaction cost for inducing the laborer's work efforts and the managerial efforts 
of the landowner produce ahigher profit, then it is more profitable for a landowner whose 
labor opportunity cost is higher for off-farm work to use a sharecropping permanent labor 
contract as a substitute for a tenancy contract. This is the reason why the sharecropping 
permanent labor contract enables the landowner to facilitate the assignment ofmanagerial 
tasks to hired labor without a high enforcement cost. It also explains why the landowner 
maintains his reputation by keeping the promise to provide a premium to the laborer, and 
why the laborer supplies his work effort o obtain high factor intensity and high yield. This 
hypothesis can be proven theoretically using the repeated game theory [22] [21] [24]. In 
Section 4 empirical evidence will be presented tosupport the hypothesis. 
2. Land Reform, Technical Progress, and Permanent Labor 
  The author conducted afield survey between June and August 1991 in Munoz, Nueva 
Ecija Province, the Philippines. All village households were stratified into four categories 
(farmer, permanent laborer, casual laborer, and others) and the households in each group 
were sampled at random. 
  The study area is located in Inner Central Luzon approximately 200 km north of Metro 
Manila, where large-scale rice plantations (hacienda)' were dominant before the Agrarian 
Land Reform Law (PD 27) was enacted. 
 In 1972, under Martial Law,PD 27 was proclaimed and the large haciendas inCentral 
Luzon were broken up. The land owned by absentee landlords was transferred to the tenants 
and the land rent was reduced. 
  Along with the land reform, irrigation infrastructure was constructed and improved, and 
new rice technologies were introduced. As a result, paddy ields increased drastically from 
60 cavans (1 cavan = 50 kg) per hectare in the mid-1970s to more than 100 cavans in 1990 
(Table I). 
 Theland reform and the new rice technology brought a significant improvement i  income 
for the ex-share-tenants. A considerable number of these farmers produced large economic 
surpluses which they invested in education, off-farm business, diversified agriculture, tc.9 
 Tables II and III show that here has been a growing tendency for farmers facing high off-
farm labor opportunity costs to employ permanent laborers for rice farming. 10 
 Table IV shows the statistical difference in annual income and working days between 
permanent laborers and casual laborers. It indicates that he difference in annual income 
was significant, but that of working days was not. These findings support my hypothesis 
that he landowner provides apremium to the permanent laborer.
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 To test the profitability of good management and that of the permanent labor contract, an 
estimation will be made of the effect of technical efficiency and employment of permanent 
labor on profitability. 
 In general, the effect of technical efficiency on profitability is significant, particularly 
where new rice technology has been adopted." For a test of the significance of the effect, an 
estimation will be made of technical efficiency and regress technical efficiency on profit. 
For this purpose, an estimate will be made of the stochastic frontier production function of 
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt [ 1 ] and Jondrow et al. [ 19]. 
 The stochastic frontier production function is defined as follows:
(1)
 where Yt is the annual gross product of rice of the tth rice farmer, Xt is a vector of inputs 
such as land, labor, fixed capital, and variable capital, b is a vector of parameters, and et is 
composed of two independent error components; et= Vt - Ut, where Vt captures the effects 
of random shocks outside the farmer's control (observation and measurement error on the 
dependent variable and other statistical noise) and Ut captures the technical efficiency of the
farmer
The technical efficiency of the tth indivi dual producer is defined as:
The conditional mean of Ut can be shown to be
(2)
where f* and F*
respectively, and
represent the standard normal density
variances used to solve e 
(MLE) of equation (1).
quation (2) are derived from the
and the distribution function
The estimates of the
maximum like lihood estimation
  A statistical test was carried out on the functional form to see whether it was closer to 
Cobb-Douglas ortranslog. The results of the t test did not reject he null hypothesis, sothere 
is no significant difference between the two [12]. 
 The estimation results of the stochastic frontier production function are shown in Table V. 
The results were used to estimate the technical efficiency of the individual farmer and a 
model specified in Table VI was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) method [12].
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The estimates in Table VI show that planted area, rice price, and technical efficiency affect 
profitability, positively, and significantly. 
 Table VI also shows that the permanent labor dummy is significantly negative if the imputed 
family labor income is not included in profit (profit 1). If it is, the dummy variable shows a 
significantly positive value (profit 2). This indicates that the farmer who hires permanent 
labor can obtain a larger household income than if he conducts the tasks assigned to permanent 
labor by himself and loses a part of off-farm income.
3. A Theoretical Model of a Sharecropping Permanent Labor Contract 
 This section presents a theoretical explanation for the existence of a sharecropping 
permanent labor contract, which has been common in the study area. It will also conduct a
theoretical nalysis of the observed facts concerning the permanent labor contract with 
emphasis placed on the observations presented earlier in this paper. 
  The analysis assumes a one-period principal-agency framework in which a landowner 
household (hereafter referred to as a landowner) maximizes his expected income with respect 
to the terms of the contract subject to the hired laborer's work efforts and reservation Utility. 12 
In this framework, the contract is defined by the variable capital or fixed capital m, the 
landowner's share of output r, and the fixed payment per hectare R, assuming constant returns 
to scale. The problem is therefore written for a unit of area, with output depending on 
variable or fixed capital, aborer's work effort (A), and the realization of the random variable 
(0). If F(m, A) •9is the yield at harvest, he laborer's income is:
 Taking account of the disutility of work, the laborer's problem is to choose an A that 
maximizes his utility, W = U(Y, A). The landowner's optimal behavior can be formulated as 
follows:
Here, P indicates the unit cost of capital, and I indicates off-farm income. They are both 
assumed to be constant. W is the reservation utility of the laborer which is exogenously 
given. 
 The next step is to extend this to a multi-period model. The sequential decision-making 
process considered here is dictated by the intertemporal characteristic of the production 
process, with the landowner announcing his strategy. If the laborer is cooperative, the
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landowner will provide him with m, the laborer choosing his action A, and the landowner 
executing his announcement. Thereafter, this process will be repeated. In general, at the 
time of the third phase of this contract, wo problems may arise. One is caused by the non-
observability of the laborer's behavior while the other is caused by the landowner's incentive 
not to honor his announcement ven when the laborer selects A. Radner [29] dealt with the 
first problem by assuming that he landowner isbound to respect his announcement, and the 
noncooperative equilibrium (indicated by *) as well as the cooperative Pareto ptimal solution 
(indicated by - ) are determined prior to activating the contract. My theory differs from 
Radner's information structure by assuming that he landowner can intentionally default on 
the contract while the tenant's action is observable. The latter hypothesis makes aretroactive 
calculation of the laborer's work effort by the landowner, based on the effect of weather ex 
post and the production function. However, when the labor input amount cannot be proven 
by the third party, the landowner may not be able to punish the laborer for defaulting on the 
contract. In this paper, it is assumed that such a punishment cannot be carried out by the 
landowner. 
 Given this information structure, I will clarify the condition that insures that he cooperative 
contract will be the equilibrium solution. For this purpose, I will establish acondition for 
the existence of (rim, A) that makes uch an efficient contract (-) acceptable. Then I show 
that if the landowner regards reputation as important, the efficient contract will be chosen. 
A. The Definition of strategy 
  In designing the above-mentioned mutual gift contract, wo contracts serve as references. 
The first contract (rn, A; r, R) is of the type presented in Cheung [8], Stiglitz [33], and Newberry 
[26], which requires the enforceability of the contract. Itcan achieve noncooperative efficient 
resource allocation. In this contract, he laborer's expected utility is W (reservation utility), 
while the landowner's expected utility (the maximum utility obtainable) is
where Z is assumed to be larger than the utility (Z') obtained when the landowner uses 
family labor and is not engaged in an off-farm job. 
  The other contract (A*; m*, r*, R*) is a type that will achieve the well-known 
noncooperative and nonenforceable Nash equilibrium." The expected utility of the laborer 
is W* = W, and that of the landowner isZ* < Z. It is assumed that Z* is larger than Z' because 
the landowner might lose his high-salaried off-farm employment opportunity if he himself 
conducts the farming operations without permanent labor.'4 
 The objective of the landowner isto design a cooperative contract (A; m, r, h) that can 
achieve ahigher utility level than in the case of a noncooperative game while the laborer
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spontaneously provides enough work effort to achieve efficiency in production. The case
considered here is one where the landowner will subtract
from so that the contract can be written as
achieve the following utility:
Laborer:
Landowner:
Z is larger than Z*.
under w
The
The next step is to determine the conditions on
hich the mutual gift strategy achieves the equilibrium contract
decision-making process in the strategy of the laborer and the landowner is as follows:
first, the laborer will decide whether he
the noncooperative contract
will accept the cooperative contract or
If he accepts the noncooperative contract, he
will decide whether he will implement it or not. If the laborer implements this contract, and 
the landowner respects the contract term, the landowner and the laborer will respectively 
obtain utility Z and W. On the other hand, if the laborer defaults on the contract, he will try
to maximize his utility in the contract
assumed that the
by choosing an action
landowner gives m to the laborer, the utility of the laborer is
Since it is
Here for the laborer and for the landowner.
In the case of the cooperative contract,
laborer implements the contract, it yields
if the landowner does not give m even though the
for the laborer and for the landowner.
  All the expected utilities, obtained inthe above-mentioned game strategies are summarized 
in Table VII. It is assumed that he game will be infinitely repeated inthe following manner 
so as to make such a mutual gift exchange contract an equilibrium strategy. In other words, 
there is the possibility that he landowner might make a contract with a laborer in every one-
period game through the repeated games. However, in such a case, the landowner and laborer 
are provided with complete information of all the strategies through the previous games. 
B. Equilibrium Contract 
 In. this contract, if the discount rates of both players are small enough, the following 
strategies will yield perfect equilibrium. That is, as long as the laborer has chosen the contract 
(A; rim, r", h) and implements i  until period t-1, the landowner will implement the contract in 
period t. However, if the laborer defaults on the contract before period t, the landowner will 
not implement the contract. Consequently, hewill not give m even if the laborer choose the 
contract. On the other hand, when given a contract in period t, the laborer will implement 
the contract only if the landowner continues to implement the contract through the games
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until period t -1. If the landowner defaults on the contract prior to period t, the laborer will 
not implement the contract even if he were to choose it. In this case, for an entire sequence 
of equilibria, acooperative contract (A; rim, r", h) will be chosen, and the landowner and the 
laborer will obtain utility (Z, W) respectively. 15Therefore, as long as the landowner provides 
the laborer with m that satisfies the conditions shown in the Appendix, an efficient 
sharecropping permanent labor contract will continue to be maintained. 
  Such a strategic combination can be interpreted as follows. When the landowner has a 
reputation ofbeing trustworthy, he can obtain utility Z every time he provides acontract by 
maintaining such a reputation. The landowner could gain in the short run by defaulting on 
the contract. However, if he defaults and loses his reputation, the laborer will not trust him 
thereafter, and he will lose potential gains. Therefore, to obtain a long-term benefit, a 
landowner will not mistreat his laborers and thereby suppress myopic incentives to default.
4. The Efficiency of Sharecropping Permanent Labor Contract in Inner Central Luzon 
  This section will present evidence for the efficiency of the sharecropping permanent labor 
contract using the data collected in the study area. The results will clarify that evidence of 
Marshallian inefficiency cannot be found under the permanent labor contract. 
  Investigation of Marshallian allocative inefficiency under the permanent labor contract 
requires a test of the difference in input use with the other tenancy forms. If all the farm 
households in a selected region face the identical relative price, we only need to conduct a 
test of the difference in input use and yield. The actual state, however, is that transaction 
costs for factors and sales of products are not negligible. Thus costs depend upon each 
family's factor endowment. 
 As Bell [6] and Shaban [30] have pointed out, past empirical evidence has been inconsistent. 
A number of studies have reported efficient resource allocation under sharecropping, while 
several others have reported lower yields and input intensities for sharecroppers. Shaban, 
who has found Marshallian inefficiency in sharecropping, points out that the existing studies 
which support the efficiency hypothesis do not take irrigation or soil conditions into 
consideration. 
 The present study carries out a statistical test of allocative efficiency by regressing the 
variables for factor intensity or yield following Shaban's approach. It is then possible to test 
efficiency resource allocation under a sharecropping permanent labor contract. 
 In the study areas, the differences in soil and irrigation conditionsare trivial. Since the 
transaction cost for obtaining inputs depends on asset endowments, uch as land and household
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income, these factors will be controlled for: "operated area of paddy field," "debt" ( as an 
index for credit), and the "price of rice." Furthermore, I control for human capital (educational 
background, age), production factor endowments besides labor (agricultural machinery), 
technology (direct seeding or transplanting), management ability (index of technical 
efficiency), and factor prices as variables that regulate the factor intensities. Finally, I test 
the difference in allocative efficiency under the permanent labor contract and other tenancy 
forms by using a permanent labor dummy. Detailed explanations of each variable are given 
in Table VIII and noted in Table IX. 
  The results of the estimation are given in Table IX. The price of rice, debt, and wage 
positively and significantly affect fixed-capital use per unit area, while planted area and 
agricultural machinery have negative and significant effects. That is, the lower the transaction 
cost of the rice price, loan or hired labor and the smaller the land or owned fixed capital, the 
larger are the factor intensities of fixed capital. For the permanent labor dummy variable, 
the parameter is positive and significant. For variable capital, the parameter of the planted 
area shows a significantly negative value. The parameter of the permanent labor dummy 
shows a positive value, and is significant. 
  The explanatory variablesfor labor intensity, the permanent labor dummy, schooling, 
planted area, wage, and direct seeding are all significant. Of these, the permanent labor 
dummy has a positive relation to factor intensity. 
  These results support he hypothesis drawn from the theoretical model that the permanent 
labor contract draws an excess supply of inputs. 
  Regarding yield, the parameters of agricultural machinery, rice price, technical efficiency, 
and debt are significantly positive, while the parameter for the planted area is significantly 
negative. However, the dummy variable relating to permanent labor is insignificant, although 
it has a positive value. 
 The result that the permanent labor contract positively affects all the factor intensities, 
differs from the Marshallian inefficiency of permanent labor contract which previous works 
have asserted.
5. Conclusion 
 The results of this study can be summarized as follows. Through its theoretical and 
empirical analysis, this study has proved that a high factor intensity is achieved under a 
sharecropping permanent labor contract in which the landowner maintains his reputation by 
allowing the laborer to apply a larger amount of factor input while the laborer trusts the 
landwner and fulfills the contract in order to continuously receive the premium produced by
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the higher factor intensity. This contractual rrangement is profitable for a landowner who 
faces a high opportunity income. 
 In Indonesia, where the agrarian land reform law was not effective in the 1970s and 1980s, 
sharecropping permanent labor contracts increased uring the same period that new rice 
technology rapidly expanded. This fact indicates that we need an alternative explanation of
the evolution of permanent labor contracts where no institutional constraints exist on land 
tenancy. 
 The major thrust of this paper has been to present a contractual choice theory of 
sharecropping permanent labor under no constraints oland tenancy and to show evidence, 
based on a Philippine case study, that he contract does not lead to an insufficient resource 
use like the Marshallian inefficiency. However, to generalize the validity of this theory, 
further empirical studies need to be conducted.
Note
' See Bardhan [4] and Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz [18]. 
z Regarding permanent labor in the Philippines, see Hayami and Otsuka [16]. 
s Regarding permanent labor in Tokugawa Japan, see Smith [32]. 
° For changes from agricultural labor to tenancy and vice versa in India, see Koga [20]. An A.N. 
  Shinha Institute (ANSISS)-ILO survey shows that a considerable number of permanent laborers 
  in Bihar, India lease land held by other tenants [27]. 
s For a review of the evolution of permanent labor in Java, see Yonekura [36] and Hart [ 14]. The 
  kasama (a Tagalog word meaning partner) system usually implies a share tenancy system in which 
  landowner and tenant share the output after deducting the production cost, except for the imputed 
  labor cost of the tenant [34]. In this system the landowner entrusts the managerial tasks to the 
  tenant. 
6 For details about permanent labor contracts inprewar China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, see 
  Minami Manshu Tetsudo Kabushikikaisha [25], Ushiyama [35], and Kuramochi [23]. 
 A similar type of sharecropping permanent labor contract in North India is reported in Fukunaga 
 [13]. 
s For the development of Inner Central Luzon, see Hayami and Kikuchi [ 15]. 
9 For information on the emergence ofsuch new rural elites, see Hayami et al. [ 17] and Shimizu and 
  Fukui [31]. 
10 These off-farm jobs include working as public servants, teachers, drivers, traders, overseas workers, 
  etc. 
11 For the contribution of technical efficiency to rice production using modern technology, see Barker 
  and Herdt [5]. 
'Z In this paper, a household is regarded as a unit of economic activity, following the precedent-
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  setting works. 
13 See Radner [291. 
'4 Here, a landowner indicates afarm household as mentioned infootnote 12. At least one household 
  member was engaged inan off-farm job with high salary in 90 per cent of my samplehouseholds 
  which hired permanent laborers. Therefore, the assumption is not unrealistic that Z* islarger than 
  Z'. 
15 See the Appendix regarding this point.
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Appendix 
Sharecropping Permanent Labor Contract and Reputation as a Perfect Equilibrium 
 Table VII shows the profit (utility) obtained by the landowner and laborer. I will show 
how a partial game strategically played by a landowner and a laborer can be used to prove 
that a cooperative share permanent labor contract can yield a perfect equilibrium. 
 First, I will consider the case where a cooperative contract is selected one period before t° 
+ k and the laborer defaults on the contract at time P+ k. In this case, when a cooperative 
contract is chosen at time t° + k, the laborer knows that the landowner will default on the 
contract even when the laborer implements the contract after t° + k; therefore the laborer 
does not have the incentive to make the work effort A as cited in the contract after t° + k. The 
landowner who knows all this information would choose a noncooperative contract. 
 In this case, the utility that the landowner and the laborer will obtain is
Laborer:
Landowner:
Here, t* indicates the contract duration. a and b indicate discount factors. 
 If both the landowner and the laborer have not defaulted on the contract before contract 
period t° + k, the laborer knows that the landowner will implement the contract when, the 
cooperative contract is chosen at time t° + k, and he will also implement the contract. As
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long as both parties repeat this strategy, the utility of the laborer is T,
while that of the landowner is L.
  On the other hand, if the landowner continues to implement he contract until t°+ k - 1, 
but does not do so at time t° + k, then the landowner who knows that the laborer will not have 
any incentive to default on the contract can obtain utility 2" (> Z) by defaulting. As a result 
of this default, after time t° + k + 1, both parties will choose a noncooperative contract, or a 
cooperative contract will be chosen and then the laborer will default on the contract. Therefore, 
in this case, the utility of the laborer is
and that of the landowner is
From this, it can be seen that the laborer's net gain from defaulting at t°+kis
while that for the landowner is
A bit of algebra shows that if a >
parties do not have an incentive to default before t°+ k for all of k.
both
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 Therefore, if t* is infinite and contract (m, A) is determined to fulfill these conditions, the 




Rice Yield in the Study Area











Sources: For 1975, P.S. Coloma, "A Benchmark Study Report: 
Barrio Bantug, Mufloz, ME.," (Munoz: Research Department, 
Management Information Center, Central Luzon State 
University, 1977); for 1983 T.S. Bernardo and O.B. Mangalindan, 
"Transaction and Arragements in Agrarian Reform (Nueva 
Ecija)," (Munoz: Rural Development S udies, Research and 
Development Center, Central Luzon State University, 1984); and 
for 1990, a field survey by the author.
Table II
Emergence of Permanent Labor Contract in the Study Area
Year
Number of the Farmers 
 Who Started to Use 
 Permanent Laborers
   Number of the Permanent 
  Laborers Who Started to Be 








































Total 33 (4) 43 (3)
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to kasugpong (fixed-wage permanent laborer).
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Table III
Non-Rice Income of Farm Households in the Study Area
  Farmer with 
Permanent Laborers





Annual non-rice income (peso)
  30 
81,483.5
  98 
41,724.2 3.3a
a Indicates that the difference in means is significant at the 1 per cent level .
Table IV
Annual Incomes and Workdays of Permanent Laborers and Casual Laborers
Permanent Laborers Casual Laborer Student t-Value
Samples 
Annual income (peso/year) 
Workdays (days/year)
  41 
17,091.5 
  200.3





a Indicates that the difference in means is significant at the 1 per cent level .
Table V





In (fixed capital) 
























Permanent Labor and Profit
Variable Dependent Variable





































































Note: The explanation of each variable is given in Table VIII. 
 * Significant at the 1 per cent level . 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level .
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Table VII
Expected Utility Matrix Showing the Game Strategy
Laborer's Strategy




   (3) 
Laborer Defects 







Notes: I Noncooperative (expectedly) enforceable contract:
Laborer: 
Landowner:
2 Noncooperative, Nonenforceable Nash equilibrium:
Laborer: 
Landowner:
3 Cooperative contract, reference strategy:
Laborer: 
Landowner:
4 Cooperative contract, laborer defaulting:
Laborer: 
Landowner:





List of Variables for Estimation
Name of Variables Description Unit
Permanent labor
Family size 















If farmer use permanent labor, = 1; 
Otherwise = 0 
Number of household members 
Ratio of female laborers to family laborers 
Number of family laboeres 
In [60 - (age of household head)]2 
Total school years of hosehold head 
In (remittance from family members living apart) 
In (owned tractor, thresher, and pump per planted 
area) 
In (average price of rice traded) 
Total area of paddy field planted in one year 
In (normalized price of fertilizer computed as total 
fertilizer expenditure) 
In (current outstanding debt) 
In (average wage of hired labor) 
Ratio of area where direct seeding was practiced 
e -1W: E(u) is the expected value of farm specific 
inefficiency u
Annual gross revenue from rice production minus 
total sum of fixed capital cost,a variable capital cost,b 
labor cost,` and land rents 
Profit I plus imputed income of family labor 














a The sum of flow costs of tractors, threshers, pumps, and draft animals. 
b Total costs of chemical fertilizer, other chemical inputs, and seeds. 
 The sum of labor costs, including all the payments for hired laborers and imputed family labor 
 costs. 




Estimation Results of Production Efficiency
Variable
Dependent Variable
























































































































Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the t-statistic. 
a In (total flow costs of tractors, threshers, and draft animals). 
b The total bags of all kinds of fertilizer inputs. 
 in (the sum of working days, including hired labor and family labor). 
a In (annual gross revenue from rice production per planted area). 
  * Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
